2 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 591 ("[T]he insider's compensation is limited by the number of shares he can purchase. This, in turn, is limited by his wealth."); see also MANNE, supra note 1, at 173 (discussing the parameters of inside information usage by government employees). 3 See infra Part II (describing how insider trading, due to the fact that it is illegal, does not involve utilization of loaned funds). 4 See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 873-76 (arguing that critics of insider trading exaggerate its supposedly perverse incentives). 5 See infra Part I (summarizing the general arguments made by those who support insider trading). 6 See infra Part II. 7 See infra Part II. 8 See infra Part III. 9 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 598 ("In short, the federal insider trading
I. THE CASE FOR INSIDER TRADING
Proponents of insider trading cite its ability to generate substantial benefits without causing substantial damage. 11 The primary alleged benefit is that, in some situations, insider trading profits are the best way to compensate executives and induce innovation. 12 Henry Manne initiated this argument. 13 [A]n entrepreneur's contribution to the firm consists of producing new valuable information. The entrepreneur's compensation must have a reasonable relation to the value of his contribution to give him incentives to produce more information. Because it is rarely possible to ascertain information's value to the firm in advance, predetermined compensation, such as salary, is inappropriate for entrepreneurs. Instead, claimed Manne, insider trading is an effective way to compensate entrepreneurs for innovations. 14 This is not what happens now. 15 Today, employees who have not created the valuable information conduct most insider trading. 16 The use of insider trading as a reward for innovation would require each public company to designate who would be allowed to make such trades, and prohibition is justifiable solely as a means of protecting rights in information."). 10 See infra Part VI. 11 MANNE, supra note 1, at 154-56 (describing variables that influence the market, irrespective of whether trades are executed via inside knowledge). 12 See id. at 155 ("Therefore, the additional compensation provided by insider trading [to executives]…also benefits the corporation."). 13 See id. at 155. 14 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 590. See also id. at 604 ("The only plausible justification . . . is the argument that legalized insider trading would be an appropriate compensation scheme."). 15 when they could occur, to monitor compliance. 17 This raises huge logistical problems. 18 The second supposed benefit of insider trading is that it enhances the accuracy of prices in the stock market. 19 Even if this were true, it is doubtful that it generates much benefit. 20 Even in the absence of insider trading, the market for frequently traded securities is already quite efficient. 21 Any benefit from the additional accuracy caused by insider trading would probably be trivial. 22 More important, insider trading also impairs the functioning of securities markets.
23
As for the alleged detriments of insider trading, its defenders claim that its scope is constrained by the wealth of individual insiders. 24 Accordingly, although the abnormal profits realized by inside traders must (at the moment) come at the expense of outsiders, the cost to the latter will be small enough that outsiders will not abandon trading in the firm's stock. 25 Edward Herman-pointing to the widespread public stock ownership and active trading in the 1920s, when insider trading was not 17 See Prentice & Donelson, supra note 15, at 4-5 (citations omitted) ("[I]nsider trading cannot be limited to the employee who created the information."). 18 See infra Part V. 19 See WILLIAM K. S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 19 (3d ed. 2010) ("Increased accuracy of securities prices may also improve capital allocation . . . [and] may enhance the efficiency of the market by moving prices in the correct direction."). 20 The supposed benefit of accurate securities prices is that they help to direct capital to the most profitable uses; however, " [ 23 See infra Part IV. 24 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 25 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 594 n.23 ("[A]ny gains siphoned off by insiders with respect to a particular stock are likely to be an immaterial percentage of the gains contemporaneously earned by the class of investors as a whole."); see also id. at 596 ("In the absence of a credible investor injury story, it is difficult to see why insider trading should undermine investor confidence in the integrity of the securities markets."); Anderson, supra note 16, at 7 ("[M]ost economists now agree that the direct impact of insider trading on counterparties is either non-existent or indeterminable."); Robert E. clearly illegal-argues that insider trading would not deter outsider trading. 26 Stock markets, however, have changed since the 1920s.
27
More important, even in the 1920s the legality of insider trading was far from clear.
28
The so-called "majority rule" allowed insider trading. 29 However, this rule was subject to an exception whenever "special facts" existed. 30 "Since there was no meaningful way to differentiate those cases that involved 'special facts' from those that didn't, the special-facts exception either ate up the majority rule or made the rule impossible to administer in a consistent fashion." money for stock trading "on margin," so, logically, insiders could borrow in a similar fashion.
35
Indeed, insiders would have both the will and the means to borrow much more heavily than outsiders.
36
In an efficient securities market, few outsiders, if any, can consistently beat the market.
37
Even if a handful of outsiders can regularly outperform the market, lenders cannot easily identify them. 38 Accordingly, lenders must treat borrowers as "noise" traders who assume all the risks of the market's volatility. 39 To insulate themselves from these risks, lenders must limit the loans they make, and either monitor the borrower's performance to make a margin call when the value of the borrower's securities falls near the amount of the loan, or demand security from a pledge of other assets owned by the borrower. 40 Insiders, however, can consistently beat the market; they already do. 41 Since their trading is less risky than outsider trading, lenders would 35 Of course, insiders can make mistakes. They might, for instance, overestimate the market's reaction to some development and by their trading push the price farther than the market deems appropriate after the development is disclosed. However, insiders are better positioned than outsiders to evaluate new information, and they can be cautious in their be willing to lend them more money. 42 Furthermore, because their trading poses little risk, insiders would be more willing to give personal assets (like their homes) as collateral to secure loans than would prudent outsiders. 43 As a result, borrowing could greatly multiply the trading capacity of insiders. 44 Alternatively, an insider could also obtain equity financing by forming a company ("insider trading equity fund" or "ITEF") to implement her trades and inviting investors to buy stock in her fund. Although it is theoretically possible for outside investors to get equity financing, 45 it would generally be foolish for others to provide such financing because few, if any, outsiders can consistently beat the market. 46 Any investor can guess, so giving money to another investor who is also guessing does not generate better returns.
47
Mutual funds offer investors an easy way to obtain and maintain diversification, and they handle the paperwork that investors would otherwise have to do themselves, 48 but they do not outperform the market.
49
Since insiders will often outperform the market, they could offer investors better returns than are otherwise available to them. 50 As such, insiders should be able to raise as much equity financing as they could profitably deploy, but in reality such equity financing is unnecessary. Entrepreneurs typically issue equity only when an investment is risky; 51 trading, so such mistakes should be rare. See Roland Benabou & Guy Laroque, Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility, 107 Q.J. ECON. 921, 924 (1992) . 42 See, e.g., MANNE, supra note 1, at 60 (noting that there is less uncertainty and risk associated with insider trading because when insiders purchase shares, the value of all shares rise). 43 Id. 44 To secure loans ready when needed, insiders could arrange lines of credit in advance with lenders. Insiders could also trade on options, which are much cheaper than the underlying stock, thereby further leveraging their trading capacity. 47 See MALKIEL, supra note 21, at 204 ("Your guess is as good as that of the ape, your stockbroker, or even mine."). 48 Id. at 372 ("In addition to offering risk reduction through diversification, the mutual funds provide freedom from having to select stocks, and relief from paperwork and recordkeeping for tax purposes."). 49 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 50 Limits to arbitrage may restrict the ability of traders to correct mispricing, so bubbles may persist. 56 The activity of uninformed (or "noise") traders may not be random and independent but may be herdlike behavior. 57 More generally, it is unclear how "rational" (or fundamental value efficient) stock markets are.
58
It is hard to see, however, how these market defects pose much risk to inside traders, who typically trade on the basis of information that is expected to be publicly disclosed shortly after being attained by these inside traders. 59 Regardless of the possible market flaws just listed, it is widely accepted that markets react quickly-and appropriately-to the REV. 1539, 1545 (1997) ("[S]hareholders seek higher returns from equity than debt because their risk levels are higher."). 52 See WILLIAM R. LASHER, PRACTICAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 560 (2011) ("Generally the return on an equity investment is higher than the return on debt or preferred because the risk is higher. Hence, the firm's cost of equity capital is higher than its cost of debt or preferred stock. The return/cost of debt tends to be the lowest of the three, because debt is the least risky investment."). 53 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 54 To the extent that equity funding was desirable, the funds would probably be private, because public offerings of stock are much more costly than private placements, and public investment companies are subject to extensive regulation. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 87 ("[A] registered public offering is a very expensive proposition . . . [and] public offering easily can take months to complete."). 55 See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 138-39 (2d ed. 1995) (presenting evidence that stock markets are not fundamentally value efficient). 56 See ROMANO, supra note 37, at 63-64 (explaining that limits to arbitrage may make it difficult to correct mispricing); see also MALKIEL, supra note 21, at 234, as reprinted in ROMANO, supra note 37, at 79-80 ("Arbitrageurs . . . are expected to take offsetting positions . . . so that any mispricing caused by irrational investors is quickly corrected."). 57 release of news. 60 Theoretically, an insider buying (or selling) a stock based on non-public (either good or bad) news could get burned if a herd of irrational noise traders happened to send the stock's price down (or up), despite disclosure of the good (or bad) news. 61 Such incidents, however, must be extremely rare; I have not noticed reference to any such cases in the voluminous literature on insider trading. At most, market irrationality might somewhat limit the ability of insiders to borrow for trading, thus forcing them to raise a little more outside equity. 62 Alternatively, insiders could sell their information. 63 An investment company could create a public "Tippee Trading Fund," and pay insiders for information on which the fund would then trade. 64 This would save insiders the time and expense of trading through their own accounts. 65 Could this situation be avoided by allowing insider trading, but limiting it to the insider's personal funds?
66 Minimally, such a limitation would radically change the standards for executive hiring and retention. A more wealthy person could reap larger returns from insider trading than an individual with less personal capital, and therefore would need fewer alternate forms of compensation. 67 Indeed, some wealthy individuals might offer to pay a company for the privilege to engage in 60 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 114 (explaining that professional investors react to new information by trading, and this moves stock prices in response to the change of information). 61 64 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 564 (discussing circumstances under which the court will not find the tippee liable).
65 Roberta Romano provocatively asks: "Could insiders profit by becoming market makers themselves and offering a lower spread?" ROMANO, supra note 37, at 665.
Without taking that step insiders could still contract to tip market makers, whose positions may enable them to exploit inside information more cheaply than anyone else can. insider trading of its stock. 68 An individual's managerial ability would still be a crucial factor, but among several talented managerial candidates, the lower salary demands of wealthier executives could be decisive. 69 The fairness of such a limitation would be questionable, as it would allow wealthier executives to reap greater profits than the less wealthy. 70 Such a limitation would also be challenging to enforce and even to define. 71 Trading on public markets is at least observable, but private financing is not.
72 How would the SEC or anyone else know whether an insider had borrowed money (e.g., from a friend or relative) with which to trade? How could one say whether an insider was using a home mortgage loan for purposes of insider trading? Insiders could also easily avoid the personal-wealth limitation by selling their inside information to tippees unless that behavior was also forbidden. 73 To avoid these problems, the law could simply limit the amount of insider trading. Establishing and enforcing appropriate limits, however, would be difficult. 74 Even limited opportunities for insider trading would affect managerial conduct, as discussed in the next section. 75 Moreover, it is unnecessary to incur these problems because any beneficial incentives created by allowing limited insider trading can be better achieved through other forms of incentive compensation. 77 This is most obvious with respect to disclosure. 78 Consider a CEO who has just received some good news and some bad news, the two of equal significance. She could disclose both simultaneously, and the company's stock price would not move. There would be then no occasion for insider trading.
Alternatively, she could disclose the two items separately. She could first sell some stock (and/or make short sales), then disclose the bad news. After the stock's price falls in response, she would buy stock at the lower price. She would then release the good news and profit when the stock price reacts by rising. Of course, her gains would be matched by the losses of outsiders, who would have lost nothing if both news items had been revealed simultaneously.
Other effects on management are less obvious, but more serious. For example, each insider would have an incentive to withhold information from colleagues and the board of directors until she could fully exploit the insider trading potential of that information.
79 Such behavior could impair management's ability to make good decisions.
80
Insiders would also have an incentive to release false or misleading information to take advantage of the duped outsiders by trading against them. 81 Releasing materially false or misleading statements violates federal securities laws, and presumably would continue to do so after the legalization of insider trading, 82 but liability 77 See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 599-600 (describing the incentive of withholding information that insiders would realize, if insider trading were permitted). 78 Id. . 80 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 81 Haft, supra note 79, at 1055 ("[P]rofit-maximizing insiders, before transmitting information upward, might attempt to arrange loans to purchase or sell a greater amount of stock than their available resources would otherwise permit. Insiders might also convey the information to select corporate outsiders to whom they owe favors or from whom they expect future benefits."). 82 See, e.g., Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2299 (2011) (opining over whether a mutual fund investment advisor was liable for a 10b-5 for this behavior has many conditions, and violations are often hard to prove. 83 Currently, occasions when insiders can benefit personally from issuing false statements are relatively rare because trading on inside information is illegal.
84 By greatly increasing the frequency of such occasions, the legalization of insider trading would substantially increase the dissemination of false or misleading information.
85
Officers would also have an incentive to run a company so as to increase the volatility of its stock by increasing risk, even if the steps taken diminish the company's value. 86 There is little potential for insider trading profit in a stock that does not often rise or fall. 87 A stock that is volatile has greater insider trading opportunities than in one that is stable. 88 Indeed, managers could profit by short selling a company's stock, and then deliberately making bad decisions that cause its stock price to plummet. 89 violation, pursuant to the dissemination of false information). 83 See, e.g., id. at 2301-02 (recognizing, inter alia, liability under SEC rule 10b-5 is limited to the person who makes the public statement; it does not extend to one who provided false information to the speaker); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976) (finding the plaintiff must prove that the speaker was not merely negligent but knew that the statement was false). 84 See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. Thus, an insider who traded after the release of materially false information would violate the securities laws if she knew the information was false or had any other material nonpublic information, even if she did not make the false statement. 85 if we assume for the sake of argument, as proponents of deregulation must, that insider trading is a stimulant that cannot be equaled by compensation tools that are currently legal, then it follows that insider trading is also dangerous, because the profit potential from a drop in security prices can motivate poor work or behavior by insiders that is disastrous to the interests of the firm."). 88 See Easterbrook, supra note 85, at 332 ("The opportunity to gain from insider trading also may induce managers to increase the volatility of the firm's stock prices. They may select riskier projects than the shareholders would prefer, because if the risk pays off they can capture a portion of the gains in insider trading, and, if the project flops, the shareholders bear the loss."). 89 See Levmore, supra note 87, at 104-05 ("[A]n insider will actually cause a loss so that a price decrease that he can profit from will occur.").
The principal defense of insider trading is that it is an efficient form of executive compensation. 90 All the foregoing considerations cast doubt on that defense.
IV. THE IMPACT OF LEGAL INSIDER TRADING ON STOCK MARKETS
In most cases it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify specific victims of insider trading. 91 It does not, however, follow that insider trading is benign. 92 To analogize, offenses such as polluting the environment or failing to pay one's taxes have nameless victims, yet the existence of harm is clear; so it is with insider trading. 93 Even proponents of insider trading acknowledge that it causes greater disparities between bid and ask prices. 94 Further, the SEC has said that "economic studies have provided support for the view that insider trading reduces liquidity, increases volatility, and may increase the cost of capital."
95 Thus, insider trading impairs more than it enhances the efficient functioning of stock markets, even when it is illegal, and therefore not very common. 96 Scholars claim that widespread insider trading did not prevent rapid growth of the stock market in the 1920s. 97 However, even at the time, insider trading was not clearly legal. 98 Moreover, both stock ownership and trading are much greater now than they were in the 1920s.
99
90 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. 91 See supra note 25, infra note 176. 92 See Levmore, supra note 87, at 105 (describing various forms of malfeasance the spectre of insider trading can bring to a going concern). 93 Id. (" [D] eregulation threatens the economy with less information and with strategically bad behavior by insiders. These arguments, and the evolution toward regulation of insider trading in so many legal systems, create a strong presumption that must be overcome by those who would deregulate."). 94 The ban on insider trading probably has something to do with this: 100 Stock traders are more sophisticated now than in the 1920s.
101
Most traders then were individuals, many of whom were buying stock for the first time and knew little of the risks, including insider trading, until they were rudely educated by the 1929 stock market crash. 102 Today, most trading is done by institutions that are keenly aware of such risks. 103 Furthermore, in the 1920s, no foreign stock markets barred insider trading, so investors had no better alternative than the American markets. 104 Today, all developed countries ban insider trading.
105
If America were to legalize insider trading, investors would simply go elsewhere.
106
Legalizing insider trading could effectively destroy public stock markets. 107 Defenders of insider trading claim that it does not harm outsiders. 108 Although it is virtually impossible to identify the victims of any particular act of insider trading, it is easy to see that it must hurt outside investors collectively.
109
Imagine two publicly traded companies with identical operations. In one there is some significant amount of insider trading; in the other there is none. In the former, insiders siphon off some of the profits from the stock. Accordingly, outsiders must value its stock lower than the stock of the latter company.
110 Nonetheless, as long as the level of insider trading stays low, the potential profits to outsiders are still high enough to attract them to purchase the stock at some price.
111
This all changes once insider trading is permitted, as it is hard to see how there could be any other trading. 112 Insiders will trade whenever no higher returns are attainable from other investments (e.g., real estate). 113 Imagine being asked to bid on a bag whose contents you do not know, but that are known to another bidder. The informed bidder will raise her bid unless and until you bid more than the bag's fair value. No reasonable person would enter such a contest. 114 It is suggested that insider trading will not scare off outsiders because they "already disregard a large body of evidence indicating that even the most sophisticated institutions have difficulty outperforming the stock market averages. . . . These investors may be convinced that certain stocks will make them money; the occurrence of insider trading may have little effect on investment so motivated."
115 Not all "uninformed" traders, however, are so naive. 116 Even investors familiar with the efficient market hypothesis buy and sell stock when they want to make additional investments, disinvest, or better diversify their portfolios.
117
As already noted, the public market in a stock can survive some level of insider trading. 118 To compensate for the gains siphoned off by 488 (1970) (explaining that such a situation is a variation on a market for lemons. That is, uninformed outsider buyers must assume that the seller is an insider with undisclosed bad news and, accordingly, discount the price they are willing to pay. With the market price so depressed, insiders will not sell unless they do have undisclosed bad news.). 115 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 26. 116 See Mendelson, supra note 110, at 475 (asserting that it is a fallacy to assume that only certain types of investors are risk-averse). 117 See Easterbrook, supra note 85, at 336 ("People invest in stock because they anticipate return."). 118 See Wagner, supra note 25, at 1001 ("[E]ven though the most widespread insider trading scandal in the history of Wall Street had just been revealed and was still being reported insiders, the market will discount a stock's price to allow rational trading by outsiders. 119 In an efficient market, uninformed investors cannot beat the market, but neither will they underperform other outsiders, "even the most sophisticated institutions." 120 They will invest in stocks if the stock market outperforms other available investments.
121
In the long run, it does.
122
If insider trading becomes rampant, however, the only trades left on the table for outsiders will be those that insiders have spurned because they offer a lower return than is available elsewhere.
123
Not even the most sophisticated mutual fund could match the performance of even a minimally skilled insider. In such a world only a fool would utilize anything but an insider trading equity fund to trade stock.
124
Not even through examining foreign experience can we adequately tell how stock markets would fare under legalized insider trading because "all countries with developed capital markets limit insider trading to some extent."
125 However, the breadth and enforcement of the prohibitions vary, and stricter insider trading bans are associated with wider stock ownership, better stock price accuracy, and deeper market liquidity.
126
The corporate cost of equity declines significantly when a country forbids insider trading and actually enforces the law. 127 on, the stock market value increased by almost 25%."). 119 Investors who trade in a futile effort to beat the market are still irrationally incurring the transaction costs of trading, but these are not very large.
120 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 26. 121 See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 881 (arguing that even if this means that insider trading at low levels will not injure outsiders, it does not follow that low levels of insider trading are not inefficient). 122 See KELLY, supra note 112, at 2-3 (documenting that returns in the stock market have exceeded returns to other investments over the past 75 years). 123 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 27 ("This delay would extend the period during which public traders incur beneficial windfalls or fortuitous losses."). 124 Curiously, some commentators acknowledge this fact but fail to draw the inevitable conclusions. Bainbridge, supra note 100, at 35-36 ("When trading with insiders, the market maker or specialist . . . will always be on the wrong side of the transaction."). However, he stops there, failing to realize that legalizing insider trading would therefore force even sophisticated players like specialists out of the stock markets, thereby devastating if not completely destroying them. Rather, he treats the ban on insider trading as a form of rents for specialists and market professionals. See id. at 35-37. 125 Bainbridge, supra note 100, at 21. Countries that more effectively bar insider trading have less volatile stock markets. 128 So it is no surprise that whenever the SEC announces enforcement actions involving insider trading, the price of the affected stock declines. 129 All this evidence contradicts the market efficiency arguments for insider trading. Although less of the pie remains for outsiders if more of it is taken by inside traders, outsiders might still be better off if insider trading spurs innovation, thereby causing the pie to expand. 130 In that case however, companies in markets that allow insider trading should have a lower cost of capital, and revelations of possible insider trading in a company's stock should cause its stock price to rise. 131 The evidence just discussed demonstrates that the opposite is true.
Outsiders might be able to share in superior profits by investing in insider trading equity funds. However, as already suggested, insiders will probably have little need to create such funds because they will be able to finance most or all of their trading with (cheaper) debt. 132 Thus, everyone but insiders would abandon the stock market. 133 As an obvious consequence, public trading in stocks would essentially cease. 134 Insiders can trade only if there are outsiders (including market makers) 135 with whom to trade. If outsiders pull out, there would be no stock market; there would be no publicly traded companies.
136
It would not, however, be tenable to have all the equity of large firms owned by just a few insiders; that is why public ownership originally evolved. If public ownership were destroyed by insider trading, large firms would have to seek investment from private equity companies. 137 In most cases, private equity owners demand control. 138 As part of that control, they also insist on full disclosure when executives buy or sell the firm's stock. 139 In other words, they do not tolerate insider trading. Thus, ironically, legalizing insider trading would lead to the extinction of public stock markets and of insider trading itself.
Although unrestricted insider trading would destroy the stock markets and thus preclude insider trading, could market forces somehow react so as to prevent this destruction? It is true that individual insiders would have no incentive to restrain their trading, 140 but, as a response, individual companies could try to curb insider trading.
V. CAN THE MARKET HANDLE INSIDER TRADING?
Public stock ownership evolved because it is efficient in many situations. The disappearance of public ownership posited in the preceding section would be inefficient, but markets tend to be efficient. 142 spreads are wider for firms with a great deal of insider trading."). See also MANNE, supra note 1, at 102 (arguing that frequent traders are more likely to be harmed by insider trading than long-term investors). If insider trading were legalized and became widespread, marketmakers would probably have to cease doing business.
136 Is this fear exaggerated? It has been pointed out that until recent legislation, government officials could trade on misappropriated nonpublic information, but this did not destroy the stock markets. However, even before the recent legislation, the legality of such trading was unclear. Compare Stephen M. Bainbridge (2011) (arguing to the contrary that politicians are also subject to political pressures against such behavior to which business executives are not exposed. As a result, the level of such misappropriation trading by government officials has been too low to destroy the stock markets. 142 See Beny, supra note 128, at 2 ("Despite theoretical arguments that stock markets are more efficient when insiders are allowed to trade freely, many increasingly regard insider Why, then, could the market itself not preserve public ownership to the extent that it is efficient? Insider trading apologists argue that corporations could have prohibited insider trading long ago, but they did not do so. 143 These apologists infer that such a prohibition would be inefficient. 144 However, in the last thirty years, many corporations have adopted insider trading prohibitions. 145 Moreover, prior to that time many corporations did not even expressly prohibit embezzlement. 146 This does not mean these corporations condoned embezzlement. Rather, they probably believed that any employee caught stealing would be fired and become unemployable, and that any further sanction would be imposed by public law. 147 The same reasoning probably applied to insider trading. 148 Although many firms in the past (and some still today) do not formally forbid insider trading, never did any firms in the past publicly condone insider trading, and none have sought exemptions from the laws against insider trading.
149
Thomas Lambert proposes that corporations be allowed to opt out of insider trading laws, so long as insiders disclose their identities and the fact of their trading at the time of their trades. 150 This arrangement would cause serious uncertainty whenever such an insider traded. 151 Insiders may trade not to exploit non-public information, but simply because they need cash or have extra cash that they want to invest.
Unable to determine the insider's reasons, outsiders and market makers could only guess and adjust the stock's price accordingly.
152
Insiders could counter erroneous inferences by denying that they were exploiting inside information. When insiders who were using nonpublic information traded, then, what would happen? 153 If the market overreacted, could the insider withdraw her trading order? An order would be executed, then, only if the market underreacted. In that case, outsiders and market makers could protect themselves only by ceasing to trade until the insider either withdrew her order or disclosed the nonpublic information. In other words, the markets would temporarily cease to function.
154
Another problem with letting each company set its own rules is that the stock of any company refusing to impose an effective ban on insider trading would fall in value.
155 Shareholders of such a company would have a legitimate complaint that they should not have to bear the resulting losses, 156 particularly because the directors deciding to allow insider trading would be among the potential beneficiaries of that policy, making their decision self-interested.
157
More importantly, although individual companies could forbid insider trading, this would not be as effective as a public ban. At the least, it would substitute thousands of company-specific rules against insider trading for the current uniform rule. Recall that the primary supposed benefit of insider trading is its efficiency with regards to rewarding corporate innovators.
158
To make the incentives effective requires a determination of which insiders were permitted to trade on each bit of inside information. 159 One problem of implementation would 152 Id. (stating that requiring trading reports could result in the filing of reports even when insiders are trading on the basis of nonpublic information). 153 Id. (proposing that to prevent such happenings, a "wolf crying" regulation be established). 154 Lambert, supra note 150, at 18-19. 155 See Mendelson, supra note 110, at 477-78; Persons, supra note 110, at 187; Wang, supra note 110, at 29-30. 156 Some commentators view inside information as property owned by the corporation. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 599, 604. However, that property now belongs, in effect, to the shareholders, for whom the directors are fiduciaries. It therefore seems inappropriate that the board approve a change in policy that would shift value from the shareholders to corporate insiders without compensation. Of course, if a company announced that it permits insider trading before it went public, public investors would then be on notice and could not complain that they were being fleeced. Id. at 605-06. 157 See Persons, supra note 110, at 189. 158 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 159 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 599-600.
be that the determination would have to be made by corporate officials after the information was disclosed to them. 160 This would entail, inter alia, substantial delay and the possibility of leakage of the information. 161 Furthermore, it is rare that an innovation can be ascribed entirely to one person. 162 Sorting out who contributed to every innovation will usually be difficult, and often contentious. "Victory has a hundred fathers, but defeat is an orphan." 163 The company would have either to let all contributors trade or allot individual rations to each contributor. The former approach raises the possibility that minor players would reap as much or more profit than the main innovators, which would severely erode the effectiveness of the program in rewarding innovation. 164 In the latter approach, the resulting complexity and potential for resentment seem overwhelming.
165
A particularly important question becomes the insider trading rights of the directors themselves. At least in theory, the board is the corporation's supreme governing body. 166 Presumably, then, a good board adds corporate value. If it does not, should the directors resign? On the other hand, recognizing that the board does not participate in operations, would employees resent the profits reaped by directors (who typically meet only one day per month) from knowledge generated by the employees? There seems to be no satisfactory solution to this dilemma.
The inevitable logistical difficulties of allocating insider trading rights also evidence the conceptual problem with using insider trading as compensation. If a board can identify the contribution of each employee to an innovation, it can better reward that employee directly rather than through the allocation of insider trading rights. One argument for insider trading is that "it allows a manager to alter his compensation package in 160 Id. 161 Id. See also Haft, supra note 79, at 1062-63. 162 See Haft, supra note 79, at 1062-63. 163 Count Galeazzo Ciano, THE OXFORD BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 203 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1992). 164 Manne conceded that many employees could trade on inside information without having contributed at all to any innovation. MANNE, supra note 1, at 173.
165 Robert Haft envisions damage to firm morale as lower level employees "recognize that each succeeding level upward possesses greater financial resources and over-all knowledge of corporate activities than the last." Haft, supra note 37, at 1057. The resentment would be even greater for those who felt that their contribution to innovation had not been properly recognized. 166 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2012) ("The business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.").
light of new knowledge, thereby avoiding continual renegotiation [of his incentive compensation package]. The manager, in effect, 'renegotiates' each time he trades." 167 In other words, the argument for insider trading assumes that a board cannot apportion credit for innovation. 168 If that is true, though, the board also cannot make detailed allotments of insider trading rights. 169 It can only permit insider trading by all employees, or by a designated class of "innovators." 170 Under the former approach true innovators will try to hide their innovations from colleagues, so as to preserve the insider trading opportunities for themselves, thereby constricting the free flow of information needed for efficient operations. 171 Nonetheless, it is virtually impossible to pursue an innovation without other employees learning about it, so inevitably, much of the insider trading profits will be reaped by others. 172 If instead a board limits insider trading to a designated group of "innovators," it will provoke tremendous resentment among excluded employees whose jobs have been tacitly labeled routine or ministerial, or not the kind of work that can add value. 173 Those in the honored group, though, would be free to profit from inside information that has nothing to do with innovation, such as an unexpectedly good or bad earnings report. 174 They would also be approved to reap insider trading profits even when they contributed nothing to an innovation. 175 Thus, true innovators will still be motivated to hide their innovations.
Equally important would be the provisions for enforcement of insider trading bans.
Violation of a company rule would not automatically give rise to shareholder standing to sue. Because it is impossible, even in theory, to identify particular victims of insider trading, 176 no shareholder could sue directly. It is disputed whether insider trading even damages the corporation. 177 Operating under the assumption that it does, only the board can sue for injuries to the corporation, unless a majority of the directors are so personally interested in the matter that bringing a lawsuit would entail suing themselves. 178 Outsiders would be left to wonder how diligently the board would ferret out and prosecute inside traders.
Even a board trying to be diligent lacks the monitoring mechanisms capable of making a difference. 179 Insiders can either hide their trading from management or refrain from trading personally but sell their information to tippees. 180 The SEC and the exchanges can monitor the stock market for unusual trading. 181 Even then, it is difficult to catch a clever inside trader.
182
Without reliable monitoring devices, even a committed board might not be very effective. 183 It would, moreover, be understandable that a sophisticated board might not want to pursue or punish insider trading too vigorously. 184 As soon as the board starts to proceed against one of its own officers, the trust between them, that is essential to effective governance, is broken. And that may be true not only for the executive(s) charged, but for all the company's officers, since management tends to view itself as a team, with interests somewhat separate from those of the board. That possibility is not currently a problem because insider trading is illegal and violations can be pursued by the SEC and individual investors; the board almost always stays hors de combat.
185
If insider trading were legalized, the board could no longer rely on others to move against it.
186
In sum, it is hard to see how reliance on the market to deter and to sanction insider trading could be nearly as effective as the current (admittedly imperfect) system under federal law. 187 At the least, a private system would leave considerable uncertainty in the trading public. Even if a company were perceived to be essentially free of insider trading, substantial changes in management or in the composition of the board might raise questions about whether substantial insider trading might be in the offing. Public investors would have to continuously monitor and price the risk of insider trading in each public company.
Especially for smaller companies, the costs of such an effort would often exceed the potential returns, so that trading in and public ownership of these stocks would decline-perhaps to the point where the costs of public ownership would exceed the benefits for many companies.
188
These companies would then go private.
Nonetheless, companies going public should be allowed to opt out of insider trading prohibitions if they disclose that policy. 189 If investors are warned of the policy, they cannot later complain about it. 
192
This would lead to all the problems with insider trading already discussed. 185 Id. at 609. 186 Id. at 602-04 (discussing corporate liability exposure when agents engage in insider trading). 187 See Bainbridge, supra note 172, at 1263-66. 188 See POSNER, supra note 177, at 449 (discussing the costs of enforcing rules against insider trading). 189 Opting out by companies that are already public would be unfair to existing shareholders, who would presumably see the price of their stock fall. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. Perhaps these companies should be allowed to opt out of insider trading laws if they held their existing shareholders harmless, but it is hard to see how that could be done. 190 
VII. CONCLUSION
A persistent band of commentators continues to claim that insider trading is beneficial or, at least, so innocuous that it should be legal. However, these arguments all presume that the level of insider trading would remain low even if it were permitted, because it would be limited by the personal wealth of individual insiders. This Note has shown that this assumption is unwarranted.
If insider trading were legal, insiders could easily obtain outside financing to exploit their informational advantage, and they would have no reason not to do so. This would drive the disadvantaged outsiders from the stock markets, thereby drastically reducing public ownership of corporations, which would also effectively end insider trading. Individual corporations lack the means and the incentives to curb insider trading on their own. It would also be unwise to treat inside information as property belonging to the corporation that can be exploited in trading for its own account. Corporations are supposed to operate for the benefit of their shareholders, not to fleece them for the benefit of some other constituency or some subset of shareholders. Accordingly, there is no plausible argument for legalizing insider trading.
